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THE RULE OF LAW, THE FORCE OF LAW 
AND THE POWER OF MONEY IN THE EU
Iris Goldner Lang *
Abstract: This paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
rule of law conditionality contained in the Proposal for a Regulation on 
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised defi ciencies 
as regards the rule of law in the Member States. The proposed Reg-
ulation establishes a link between a Member State’s violation of the 
rule of law and the suspension of EU payments. The text examines the 
effects of the connection between the rule of law and EU money, both 
for the erring Member State and for the EU as a whole. The discussion 
shows that, despite the fact that the EU-level approach to the rule of 
law has signifi cant benefi ts, it, at the same time, creates new risks. 
It may undermine the balance of powers in the EU by expanding the 
political and economic power of certain Member States over others, 
the power of EU institutions over Member States, and the power of the 
European Commission over other EU institutions. It is also question-
able whether there is a suffi ciently strong causal relation between the 
rule of law defi ciency and threats to the EU’s fi nancial interests. Most 
importantly, it is uncertain to what extent the rule of law conditionality 
will lead to the true transformation of negative, anti-rule-of-law trends 
in some Member States, which raises the question of whether the Rule 
of Law Proposal is capable of responding to the current challenges. 
Keywords: rule of law, conditionality, legal basis, suffi ciently direct 
link, Art 7 TEU, Commission, Hungary, Poland. 
1 Introduction
The rule of law at the EU level has moved from being a mere political 
statement and something to be taken for granted to becoming a func-
tioning legal principle that is protected not only by the Court of Justice, 
but also by the EU political institutions. As a consequence, new and 
more powerful legal mechanisms are emerging that are relying on the 
role of EU political institutions and processes in preserving the rule of 
law and in altering Member States’ behaviour accordingly.1 This paper 
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1  See section 4.1.
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discusses the most recent legislative initiative in this area, which estab-
lishes a link between a Member State’s violation of the rule of law and 
the suspension of EU payments, by making payments from EU funds 
conditional upon Member States’ respect of the rule of law. This initiative 
is embodied in the newly drafted Proposal for a Regulation on the protec-
tion of the Union’s budget in case of generalised defi ciencies as regards 
the rule of law in the Member States (hereinafter: Rule of Law Proposal).2 
This paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the rule of 
law conditionality, contained in the Rule of Law Proposal. The text exam-
ines the effects of the link between the rule of law and EU money, both 
for the erring Member State and for the EU as a whole. By doing so, it 
aims to assess the impact of the rule of law conditionality on further EU 
dynamics. The discussion shows that, despite the fact that the EU-level 
approach to the rule of law has signifi cant benefi ts, it, at the same time, 
creates new risks. On the positive side, it elaborates what is meant by the 
rule of law as a common EU-level standard. This is particularly import-
ant due to the developments in some Member States, which have under-
mined the perception that there is a common Union understanding of the 
rule of law. It also enables the establishment of common EU-level norms 
on the rule of law that can increase the power, legitimacy, and protection 
provided by the rule of law across the EU, by creating common criteria 
and effective mechanisms for establishing and punishing its violation. 
On the other hand, the new Rule of Law Proposal, as it now stands, may 
undermine the balance of powers in the EU by expanding the political 
and economic power of certain Member States over others, the power of 
EU institutions over Member States to control their judiciary and other 
state authorities, and the power of the European Commission over other 
2  Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of 
generalised defi ciencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States COM(2018) 324 fi nal. 
The Proposal was put forward by the Commission on 2 May 2018. It was then referred to the 
Budgets Committee and the Budgets Control Committee, with opinions from the Civil Lib-
erties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, the Constitutional Affairs Committee and the 
Regional Development Committee. Their report (2018/0136(COD)), suggesting a number of 
amendments, in particular by putting the Parliament on the same footing as the Council 
when adopting and lifting measures, was put to the vote on 18 December and tabled to 
plenary. In the meantime, on 17 July 2018, the European Court of Auditors delivered its 
opinion on the Proposal, recommending that the Proposal needs to be improved by setting 
more specifi c criteria for its application and clearer safeguards for benefi ciaries of EU pro-
grammes (ECA Opinion No 1/2018). On 17 January 2019, in its fi rst reading, the European 
Parliament backed the Proposal, with 397 votes in favour and 158 against the Committee 
report and 69 abstentions (Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 17 Jan-
uary 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised defi ciencies as regards the 
rule of law in the Member States, P8_TA-PROV(2019)0038). They suggested a number of 
amendments, in particular the introduction of a detailed defi nition of what creates ‘general 
defi ciencies’. 
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EU institutions. It opens up the question of who in the EU should take 
the lead as the guardian of the rule of law − should it be the Member 
States or the EU institutions, and, if the EU institutions, should it be the 
Court of Justice, the Commission, or somebody else? It is also question-
able whether there is a suffi ciently strong causal relation between the 
rule of law defi ciency and threats to the EU’s fi nancial interests. Most 
importantly, it is uncertain to what extent the rule of law conditionality 
will lead to the true transformation of negative, anti-rule-of-law trends in 
some Member States, which opens up the question of whether the Rule of 
Law Proposal is capable of responding to the current challenges. 
The discussion sets off by exploring the logic of the Rule of Law 
Proposal in the second section, and its expected effectiveness, linking 
it to the question of fairness, in the third section. The fourth section 
moves on to the issue of its legality, which is discussed from four differ-
ent perspectives. The fi rst part scrutinises the legal basis of the Proposal 
and places it in the context of the inadequacy of the existing rule-of-law 
instruments. The second part examines whether there is a suffi ciently 
strong link between a Member State’s violation of the rule of law and 
the risk that this would impact on the successful implementation of EU 
funding. The third part of this section questions the compatibility of 
the Proposal with Art 7 TEU, while the last part examines the pros and 
cons of granting considerable powers to the Commission. The conclud-
ing section aims to summarise why the EU needs an effi cient rule-of-law 
mechanism and the boundaries the new mechanism should not cross. 
The paper does not engage in discussion of the various meanings of 
rule of law in legal theory,3 the history of codifi cation of the principle of 
the rule of law in EU primary law,4 or the recent case law of the Court of 
3  See, for example, AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Mac-
millan 1959) 114; FA Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago Press 1944) 75−90; 
J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’ in J Raz The Authority of Law (OUP 1979); LL Fuller, 
The Morality of Law (rev ed, Yale University Press 1965) ch 2; R Dworkin, A Matter of Princi-
ple (Harvard University Press 1985). On different facets of the rule of law, see B Tamanaha, 
On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (CUP 2004); J Tasioulas, ‘The Rule of Law’ 
King’s College London Law School Research Paper No 018-21, forthcoming in J Tasioulas 
(ed), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law (CUP 2019). On the distinction 
between the formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law, see PP Craig, ‘Formal 
and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) Public 
Law 467.
4  The principle of the rule of law is mentioned in several places in the TEU. First, in the 
TEU’s preamble, the Member States confi rm their attachment to the rule of law. The princi-
ple of the rule of law is one of the EU values listed in Art 2 TEU. The rule of law is indirectly 
referred to in Art 7 TEU, which lays down the procedure in the case of a Member State’s 
violation of one of the values listed in Art 2 TEU. Further, according to Art 21(1) TEU, the 
Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the rule of law. Finally, accord-
ing to Art 21(2)(b) TEU, the Union shall pursue its external policies and actions in order to 
consolidate and support, among other things, the rule of law. The rule of law, as one of the 
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Justice on this issue.5 It starts from the premise that the concept of the 
rule of law, as understood at the EU level and in this text:
includes the principles of legality, implying a transparent, accountable, 
democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; 
prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; effective judicial 
protection by independent courts, including protection of fundamental 
rights; separation of powers and equality before the law.6 
2  The logic behind the Rule of Law Proposal
Several years ago, I read a text by Professor Audrey Macklin titled 
‘The Rule of Law, the Force of Law and the Rule of Force’.7 The text dealt 
with a matter which is unrelated to the discussion in this paper. Howev-
er, inspired by this title, I would like to suggest that linking a violation of 
the rule of law to the suspension of EU funds is a strong manifestation 
of the ‘force of law’. This statement − as well as the link between the 
rule of law, the rule of force, and the force of law − can be exemplifi ed in 
Hungary and Poland. First, the developments in Hungary and Poland 
have been characterised by EU institutions as a deviation from the rule 
of law towards a combination of a ‘rule by law’ and the ‘rule of force’.8 In 
this context ‘rule by law’ can be understood as a distorted version of the 
rule of law, where social behaviour is still regulated by law, but it is not 
important what the content or the objectives of this law are, ie it does not 
matter whether it satisfi es the criteria of liberal democracy.9 
Union’s values, is also mentioned in the preamble of the Charter, while a number of elements 
of the rule of law are provided in the provisions of the Charter, in particular Art 41 (the right 
to good administration) and Art 47 (the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial). 
5  See, in particular, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
 ECLI:EU:C:2018:117; Case C-216/18 PPU LM ECLI:EU:C:2018:586; Case C-192/18 Com-
mission v Poland (case in progress); Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland (case in progress, 
but see the Order of the Vice-President of the Court in Case C-619/18 R). For a discussion 
on this topic, see, for example, Tamara Δapeta’s contribution (entitled ‘Sudovi i vladavi-
na prava’ [‘Courts and the Rule of Law’] to the online proceedings of the conference ‘EU 
as a Global Leader in the Rule of Law’, held in Zagreb on 22 February 2019, available at 
<www.pravo.unizg.hr/EJP/conference_series/eu_kao_globalni_lider_u_vladavini_prava> 
accessed 30 June 2019. 
6  Defi nition of the rule of law provided in the Rule of Law Proposal, Art 2(a). 
7  A Macklin, ‘The Rule of Law, the Force of Law, and the Rule of Force’ in J Williamson 
(ed), Omar Khadr, Oh Canada (McGill Queens University Press 2012). 
8  To that effect, the European Commission activated the Rule of Law Framework and the 
Art 7 TEU procedure against Poland, while the European Parliament activated the Art 7 
TEU procedure against Hungary. 
9  See the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe ‘Rule of Law Checklist’, adopted by 
the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016), where the 
Venice Commission ‘warned against the risks of a purely formalistic concept of the Rule of 
Law, merely requiring that any action of a public offi cial be authorised by law’ and stated 
5CYELP 15 [2019] 1-26
On the other hand, the EU institutions and some of the EU Member 
States are trying to work out how to urge Member State like Hungary 
and Poland to respect the (EU-level understanding of the) rule of law and, 
in doing so, they plan to use the ‘force of law’, manifested through the 
‘power of money’. The ‘force of law’ gets to the heart of the Rule of Law 
Proposal, as it aims to achieve respect of the rule of law by applying com-
pulsion based on law, by sanctioning Member States that violate the rule 
of law. It is no coincidence that a Member of the European Parliament 
and former EU Commissioner for Justice and Fundamental Rights, Vivi-
en Reding, stated that making a link with EU money ‘would be the most 
effective way to infl uence the behaviour of a government like the Polish 
one’ as it is ‘the only thing they understand’.10
3  Estimating effectiveness: can the Rule of Law Proposal achieve 
its aim? 
According to the Rule of Law Proposal, its sole objective is to protect 
the Union’s budgetary interests. Protection of the rule of law itself is not 
an objective set by the Proposal, but only a means for the protection of 
the EU budget. The Proposal explicitly states that its only objective is ‘to 
avoid that the Union budget is harmed by situations where a generalised 
defi ciency as regards the rule of law in a Member State affects or risks af-
fecting the sound fi nancial management and the protection of the fi nan-
cial interests of the Union’.11 It is, consequently, based on Art 322(1)(a) 
TFEU.12 The legality of this legal basis and whether there is a suffi ciently 
strong causal relation between the rule of law defi ciency and threats 
that ‘“Rule by Law”, or “Rule by the Law”, or even “Law by Rules” are distorted interpreta-
tions of the Rule of Law’ para 15. See also the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (‘the Copenhagen document’) of 1989 
(cited in footnote 4 of the Venice Commission ‘Rule of Law Checklist’), where the participat-
ing states proclaimed that ‘the rule of law does not mean merely a formal legality which as-
sures regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, 
but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human 
personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression’ 
para 2, available at <www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true> accessed 7 
May 2019. See also Victor Orban’s speech on his plan to build an illiberal state, available at 
Budapest Beacon 29 July 2017 <https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-
speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/> accessed 5 May 2019. 
10  J Stearns, ‘Europe’s Eastern Rebels Expose Next Fault Line for EU Leaders’ (2017) 
Bloomberg, 30 July 2017 <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-30/europe-s-
eastern-rebels-expose-next-fault-line-for-eu-leaders> accessed 10 March 2019. 
11  Explanatory Memorandum and Art 1 of the Rule of Law Proposal. 
12  Art 322(1)(a) TFEU provides: ‘The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accor-
dance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Court of Auditors, 
shall adopt by means of regulations the fi nancial rules which determine in particular the 
procedure to be adopted for establishing and implementing the budget and for presenting 
and auditing accounts’.
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to the EU’s fi nancial interests will be explored below. At this point, it is 
proposed that the primary objective of the Rule of Law Proposal is not to 
protect the EU budget, but to compel EU Member States to respect the 
rule of law, and that this objective is more dominant or at least as im-
portant as the budgetary objective, even though this is not visible from 
the Proposal. In other words, it is suggested that the preservation of the 
rule of law is the actual objective of the Proposal − as suggested by the 
statement of MEP Reding − whereas the Union’s budgetary interests are 
only a means of achieving the rule of law objective, and not the other way 
round, as it would have appeared from the Proposal. 
Consequently, if we start from the premise that it is not the protec-
tion of the Union’s budget, but of the rule of law itself, that is the true 
aim of the Proposal, it is questionable whether the Proposal is capable of 
achieving this aim. Measuring the effectiveness of the Proposal depends 
on how we defi ne the rule of law objective. There are two possibilities 
here. If the objective is limited to forcing certain legislative changes in a 
Member State, there is the likelihood that this objective will actually be 
achieved, provided the respective Member State is a net recipient and, 
therefore, dependent on EU funds.13 If the respective Member State is 
a net contributor, the carrot-and-stick approach, embedded in the rule 
of law conditionality, will be far less motivating.14 Consequently, such a 
divergent or even discriminatory effect of the rule of law conditionality 
on net recipients, in comparison to net contributors, can be perceived as 
unfair, thus leading to open or covert disapproval by the net recipient 
Member States.   
On the other hand, if the objective of the Rule of Law Proposal is 
deeper than mere legislative change, ie if the intention behind the bond 
between the rule of law and EU funds is a profound change of legal cul-
ture and the adoption of new patterns of political behaviour in Member 
States such as Hungary and Poland, it is highly questionable whether 
13  Both Hungary and Poland are net recipients of EU funds. In 2015, Poland was the larg-
est net benefi ciary of EU funding, receiving EUR 6.6 billion (source: ‘Netherlands Largest 
Net Contributor to EU This Century’ CBS, available at <www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2016/50/
netherlands-largest-net-contributor-eu-this-century> accessed 5 May, 2019. Also, the 
share of EU cohesion policy funding for public investment in Poland in 2015-2017 was 
61.17%, whereas in Hungary it was 55.46% (source: <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/
Other/-of-cohesion-policy-funding-in-public-investment-p/7bw6-2dw3/data> accessed 5 
May 2019. 
14  Nevertheless, even in the case of net contributors, the suspension of EU funding could 
create signifi cant political problems in the respective Member State. On the link between 
the positive perception of Hungarian citizens of Hungarian EU membership and the fi nan-
cial support gained from the Union, based on recent public polls, see ‘European Union: 
The Cash Cow and the Curse of Migrants, Hungarian Spectrum’, 26 April 2019, available 
at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2019/04/26/european-union-the-cash-cow-and-the-
curse-of-migrants/> accessed 5 May 2019). 
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this objective can be achieved by the Proposal. A truly accepted and inter-
nalised form of rule-of-law-compliant behaviour can hardly be achieved 
by coercive and sanctioning methods, as it requires political and societal 
support from within. Unless the respective Member State has a critical 
mass of citizens and organisations which share a European understand-
ing of the values prescribed by Art 2 TEU, the rule of law conditionality 
is likely to be perceived as forcefully imposed from the outside − instead 
of being wanted, needed or consented to internally.15 Consequently, the 
external imposition of legal and political standards and its linking to 
fi nancial sanctions is not likely to result in a profound transformation 
of legal culture and political behaviour unless there is real commitment 
and support in the respective Member State. As a result, the uncertain 
effectiveness of the link between the rule of law and EU money, and, even 
more importantly, the questionability of a sanction-based method as the 
right way to tackle rule of law compliance are two major weaknesses of 
the Rule of Law Proposal. 
The accession negotiations of the former candidate countries for EU 
membership − such as Croatia, as the youngest EU Member State − are 
a good example of this claim. Every new EU accession is more and more 
strictly grounded on the principle of conditionality, which makes it ever 
more demanding for a new state to join. All candidate countries, includ-
ing Croatia, had, among other obligations, to fulfi l the Copenhagen polit-
ical criteria in order to join the EU.16 The Copenhagen political criteria to 
a large extent coincide with the EU values listed in Art 2 TEU and, since 
1993, they have been part of the conditions for EU accession for any 
new Member State.17 However, the Croatian experience has shown that 
the fulfi lment of the Copenhagen criteria was accomplished relatively 
successfully, as there is usually strong commitment to EU membership 
− both among domestic policy-makers and among citizens in the candi-
15  A number of measures in Hungary, such as those targeted against the Open Society and 
NGOs in Hungary,  aim to reduce the critical mass of citizens and organisations support-
ing the EU understanding of the rule of law. By doing this, there is less and less chance 
that the transformation will happen from within. On recent public opinion polls in Hun-
gary, see ‘The Storm Created over Calling the Orban Regime What It is − a Fascist State’ 
(2018) Hungarian Spectrum, 27 December 2018, available at <http://hungarianspectrum.
org/2018/12/27/the-storm-created-over-calling-the-orban-regime-what-it-is-a-fascist-
state/> accessed 5 May 2019). On modes used by Victor Orban to steer public opinion 
in Hungary, see: Zoltan Simon, ‘Orban’s Propaganda Machine Keeps Hungarian Protests 
in Check’ (2019) Bloomberg, 11 January 2019, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-01-11/orban-s-propaganda-machine-keeps-hungarian-protests-in-check> 
accessed 5 May 2019. 
16  The Copenhagen political criteria are the stability of institutions guaranteeing democra-
cy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 
17  European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 
180/1/93 REV 1. 
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date country − which enables the better adoption and internalisation of 
external standards.18 Consequently, EU accession becomes a trigger and 
catalyst of internal political and institutional reforms, which − in ideal 
circumstances − lead to the true adoption of EU values.19 From this per-
spective, the Rule of Law Proposal could be expected to be productive: if 
conditioning accession on political and societal harmonisation with EU 
values leads to the acceptance of these values, then conditioning access 
to EU funds on the acceptance of EU values could achieve the same 
result. On the other hand, the developments in Hungary and Poland 
open up the question of the effi cacy and irreversibility of the accom-
plished pre-accession reforms. The Rule of Law Proposal is an indirect 
EU acknowledgement that signifi cant differences in legal cultures and 
patterns of political behaviour are immanent in the Union today − es-
pecially since the Central and Eastern European enlargements in 2004 
and 2007. From this perspective, it is questionable whether the Proposal 
is capable of bridging these differences and achieving the targets it sets. 
4 The legality of the Rule of Law Proposal
The following subsections will examine the legality of the Rule of 
Law Proposal by looking at its legal basis, by questioning the credibility 
of the link between the violation of the rule of law and the non-implemen-
tation of EU-funded operations, by examining the compatibility of the 
Proposal with Art 7 TEU, and by estimating the powers granted to the 
European Commission. 
4.1 Legal basis
The Rule of Law Proposal is based on Art 322(1)(a) TFEU which pro-
vides for the adoption of fi nancial rules which determine the procedure 
for establishing and implementing the EU budget. This legal basis is 
linked to the proclaimed ‘sole objective’ of the Proposal, ie with the pro-
tection of the Union’s budget in the case of ‘generalised defi ciencies as 
regards the rule of law’ where such defi ciencies ‘affect or risk affecting 
18  On this topic, see, in particular, T Δapeta, ‘Courts, Legal Culture and the Enlargement 
of the EU’ (2005) 1 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 23; I Goldner Lang, Z 
Durdevic & M Mataija, ‘The Constitution of Croatia in the Perspective of European and 
Global Governance’ in A Albi and  S Bardutzky (eds), National Constitutions in European 
and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (TMC Asser Press, forthcoming 
2019). 
19  On the catalyst effect of the enlargement policy, see M Cremona, ‘Enlargement: A Suc-
cessful Instrument of EU Foreign Policy?’ in T Tridimas (ed), European Union Law for the 
Twenty-First Century: Vol 1, Rethinking the New Legal Order (Hart Publishing 2004). See also 
I Goldner Lang, ‘The Impact of Enlargement(s) on the EU Institutions and Decision-Making’ 
(2012) 31(1) Yearbook of European Law 473. 
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the principles of sound fi nancial management or the protection of the 
fi nancial interests of the Union’.20
 How does one determine whether the choice of the legal basis is 
the correct one? The Court of Justice long ago held that that the Union’s 
choice of the legal basis for a measure ‘may not depend simply on an 
institution’s conviction as to the objective pursued, but must be based 
on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review’ and which ‘in-
clude in particular the aim and content of the measure’.21  It also stated 
that if the examination of the measure 
reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold compo-
nent, and if one of those is identifi able as the main or predominant pur-
pose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, that meas-
ure must be based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the 
main or predominant purpose or component.22 
Its other elements cannot have the effect of altering or transforming 
the character of the measure.23 Exceptionally, if a measure simultane-
ously pursues several objectives, which are inseparably linked without 
one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, the measure 
may be founded on the corresponding legal basis.24
According to the Commission, the ‘aim and content’ of the Rule of 
Law Proposal is the protection of the Union’s fi nancial interests and the 
principle of sound fi nancial management from generalised defi ciencies 
20  See the Explanatory Memorandum and Arts 1 and 3(1) of the Rule of Law Proposal. It 
has been noted by the Council Legal Service, in its Opinion on the Rule of Law Proposal, 
that the proclaimed objective of the Rule of Law Proposal is narrower than the scope of Art 
322(1)(a) TFEU, which could have implied that its proper legal basis should have been Art 
325(4) TFEU, which sets out the procedure for the adoption of ‘measures in the fi elds of the 
prevention of and fi ght against fraud affecting the fi nancial interests of the Union’. However, 
as stated in the Council Legal Service Opinion, the fact that the scope of Art 322(1)(a) TFEU 
is broader than the objective stated by the Rule of Law Proposal should not be a problem, 
as the material scope of the Rule of Law Proposal is broader than the objective it sets forth. 
What the Rule of Law Proposal actually claims to enable is the proper implementation of the 
Union’s budget according to the principles of sound fi nancial management, which actually 
presupposes the existence of preventive and corrective measures against fraud (Opinion of 
the Legal Service, 13593/18, LIMITE, Brussels, 25 October 2018, para 43. Despite the fact 
that the Opinion is not a public document, the author managed to gain access to it). 
21  See, among others, Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, para 10; Case 
C-155/07 European Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2008:605, para 34; Case C-411/06 
Commission v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2009:518, para 45. 
22  See, among others, Case C-137/12 Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:2013:675, para 
53; Case C-411/06 Commission v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2009:518, para 46; Case 
C-155/07 European Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2008:605, para 35. 
23  Opinion 2/00 ECLI:EU:C:2001:664.
24  See, among others, Case 165/87 Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:1988:458, para 11; 
Case C-300/89 Titanium Dioxide ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, para 17.
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as regards the rule of law.25 Accordingly, the Commission has formu-
lated the measure as essentially a fi nancial rule and not as a rule of 
law mechanism. The rule of law has, for pragmatic reasons, been given 
only a secondary role as a mere tool/instrument for the protection of 
the Union’s fi nancial interests. The pragmatic reason for this circuitous 
approach is the (unfortunate) fact that there is currently no legal basis 
in the Treaties to enable the adoption of a ‘pure’ rule of law measure. 
Art 2 TEU cannot be the legal basis of a new instrument on its own, 
but would require recourse to another Treaty provision − as manifested 
in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.26 Considering this legal 
constraint, the Commission’s recourse to a budgetary legal basis and its 
insistence on the fi nancial objective can be viewed as a pragmatic and 
creative manoeuvre intended to avoid gridlock, just as many internal 
market measures were in the past. 
This does not mean that the link between the rule of law and EU 
spending is not real. Quite the reverse, the rule of law is certainly an im-
portant precondition for the sound implementation of the Union’s budget 
in EU Member States. The malfunctioning of public authorities and judi-
cial bodies could affect or risk affecting the proper spending of EU funds 
in the respective Member State. From this perspective, it seems only 
natural that the EU wishes to protect its fi nancial interests by suspend-
ing payments in cases where they could be misspent due to generalised 
defi ciencies in the rule of law. Such a salient link between the rule of law 
and the way EU money is spent gives credibility to this Proposal. Equally 
important, both the EU political institutions and the Court of Justice 
have shown a (political) will to protect the rule of law at the level of the 
EU. Consequently, provided that the Rule of Law Proposal articulates the 
link between the Union’s fi nancial interests and the rule of law in a suf-
fi ciently precise and clear manner,27 we can expect it to receive the green 
light from all EU institutions, including the Court of Justice (if asked). 
However, the fact that the Rule of Law Proposal is likely to be adopt-
ed and accepted by all the EU institutions (most probably, provided the 
current draft undergoes certain changes), as well as the fact that there 
is a tangible link between the rule of law and the spending of EU mon-
ey, cannot conceal the true motive behind the Proposal. The dominant 
motive and target of the Rule of Law Proposal is not the protection of the 
Union’s budget, but the protection of the rule of law itself. Testimony to 
this is the legal and political developments in the period between the 
25  Rule of Law Proposal, Recitals 4 and 11 and Arts 1 and 3(1). 
26  Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
27  The issue of the existence of an (in)suffi ciently strong link between the Union’s fi nancial 
interests and the rule of law will be discussed in the following subsection. 
11CYELP 15 [2019] 1-26
adoption of Art 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Proposal, which show that 
the Rule of Law Proposal is a measure with a rule-of-law agenda, which 
emerged as yet another attempt among a series of EU measures aimed 
at preventing Member States’ violations of the rule of law. Consequent-
ly, despite its legal basis in a budgetary Treaty norm, the Rule of Law 
Proposal can only be understood in the context of the Union’s increased 
concerns over the rule of law crisis in certain Member States, its inability 
to respond to these violations with the measures at hand, and its efforts 
to fi nd a new and effi cient mechanism to remedy the violations, while 
lacking a Treaty basis to adopt a straightforward rule of law targeted 
measure.  
The aim of the following paragraphs is to address the inadequacy of 
the rule of law instruments that have been used by the EU so far, and 
explain the chain of developments leading to the Rule of Law Proposal, 
thus supporting the statement that the Proposal was drafted with the 
primary motive to protect the rule of law and not the EU budget. 
The political and judicial mechanisms that have been used as a re-
sponse to rule of law violations so far have been a mixture of three types: 
those adopted exclusively for the protection of the rule of law (Rule of Law 
Framework and Art 7 TEU); those aimed at any type of state violation 
of EU law (infringement proceedings);28 and those having a completely 
different objective, which does not encompass and should not be used for 
the protection of the rule of law (suspension of payments from the Cohe-
sion Fund under the excessive defi cit procedure). For different reasons, 
none of these instruments has proven suffi ciently effective to protect the 
rule of law. 
So far, the most striking example of an EU measure which had a 
completely different objective than the rule of law, while being instru-
mentalised for a rule of law purpose, was the Commission’s proposal 
of 22 February 2012 to suspend the disbursement of EUR 495 million 
from the Cohesion Fund for Hungary for 2013, due to its failure to ad-
dress excessive defi cit.29 The proposal was based on the then Cohesion 
Fund Regulation, which provided for the possibility to suspend the total 
or part of the disbursement from the Fund in the case of an excessive 
government defi cit and the absence of effective action to correct it.30 The 
28  In addition to infringement proceedings, the Court of Justice has been using its power to 
interpret EU law under the preliminary reference procedure to decide on matters that deal 
with the rule of law.
29  Press release available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-161_en.htm> 
accessed 15 March 2019. 
30  Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 [2006] OJ L210/79, Art 4(1).  
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Proposal was adopted as a Council Implementing Decision on 13 March 
2012.31 This has been the only time in EU history that a decision has 
been adopted to suspend payments from the Cohesion Fund due to an 
excessive defi cit. In the end, Hungary took measures to correct the ex-
cessive defi cit and the Council decided to lift the suspension before the 
beginning of 2013.32 Nevertheless, the suspension decision remains an 
unprecedented (and harsh) sanction for projected violations of EU law 
(projected excessive defi cit), as it would have applied to a future period 
(2013) and was targeted at a Member State whose defi cit, at that time, 
was among the lowest in the EU.33 
Signifi cantly, almost in parallel to this measure, the relations be-
tween Hungary and the Commission became increasingly tense for dif-
ferent reasons.  In 2011 Hungary adopted several controversial rules un-
der the new constitution, which the Commission saw as undermining the 
independence of the Hungarian Central Bank, its judiciary and the its 
data protection authority. As a response, on 17 January 2012, the Com-
mission launched three accelerated infringement proceedings against 
Hungary.34 In the end, the Commission was satisfi ed with the changes 
Hungary made to its Central Bank statute, but referred Hungary to the 
Court of Justice on matters of the independence of the data protection 
authority and the measures affecting the judiciary.35 The case on the 
data protection authority was decided by the Grand Chamber judgment 
on 8 April 2014.36 The Court ruled that the abrupt termination of the 
Hungarian Data Protection Commissioner’s term of offi ce by the govern-
ment constituted an infringement of the independence of the data pro-
tection authority and was hence in breach of EU law. In the second case 
on the Hungarian judiciary, the Court of Justice found that the radical 
lowering of the retirement age for Hungarian judges, prosecutors and no-
taries from 70 to 62 constituted discrimination based on age which was 
not proportionate as regards the objectives pursued. Consequently, the 
31  Council Implementing Decision of 13 March 2012 suspending commitments from the 
Cohesion Fund for Hungary with effect from 1 January 2013 [2012] OJ L78/19.
32  11648/12, PRESSE 278, 22 June 2012. 
33  F Guarascio, ‘EU to Cut Hungary’s Regional Funds over Defi cit’ (2012) Euractiv, 23 Feb-
ruary 2012, available at <www.euractiv.com/legacy_byline/francesco-guarascio/> ac-
cessed 15 March 2019. 
34  Press release available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-24_en.htm> ac-
cessed 15 March 2019. 
35  In the end, the Commission was satisfi ed with the changes Hungary made to its Central 
Bank statute, but referred Hungary to the Court of Justice concerning the independence of 
the data protection authority and the measures affecting the judiciary (Press Release avail-
able at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-395_en.htm> accessed 15 March 
2019.
36  Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2014:237.
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Court concluded that Hungary failed to fulfi l its EU obligations under 
Directive 2000/78 on equal treatment in employment and occupation.37 
Taking into consideration the political tension between Hungary 
and the Commission − which escalated with the launching of infringe-
ment proceedings − it is diffi cult not to link these developments with the 
Commission’s proposal to suspend disbursement to Hungary from the 
Cohesion Fund due to its excessive defi cit. Two other facts, noted above, 
indicate that the Commission’s proposal to suspend payments to Hunga-
ry had a different motive from tackling its excessive defi cit. First, this has 
been the only instance the proposal to suspend funds due to excessive 
defi cit has been launched and, second, at that time there were Member 
States with worse defi cits than Hungary, but which were not threatened 
by the same type of procedure. All this suggests that the actual target of 
the Commission’s proposal was not Hungary’s excessive defi cit, but that 
the proposal pursued a different objective.38 It calls into question the 
credibility of the excessive defi cit procedure, which has been instrumen-
talised for a different aim than the one it was designed for. It also brought 
to the surface the gaps in the EU system which obviously lacked another 
mechanism, apart from Art 7 TEU, and infringement proceedings by 
which it could tackle defi ciencies in Member States’ rule of law. 
The need for an effi cient new instrument to protect the rule of law 
was consequently enunciated in September 2012 by the then President 
of the European Commission in his State of the Union address, in which 
he declared that the Union needed a better developed set of instruments 
for the protection of the rule of law − not just an alternative between the 
‘soft power’ of political persuasion and the ‘nuclear option’ of Art 7 TEU.39 
Finally, on 11 March 2014, the Commission put in place the Rule of Law 
Framework with the aim of strengthening the EU’s capacity to protect 
the rule of law and prevent threats to the rule of law from escalating to 
the point where the Commission has to trigger Art 7 TEU.40 Even though 
the Rule of Law Framework did not mention any Member State in par-
37  Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
38  The link between the excessive defi cit procedure and infringement proceedings has been 
suggested by a number of commentators. However, when asked about this link, the then 
EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs stated that it was a ‘different pro-
cedure’. S Taylor, ‘Commission Plans to Suspend Hungary’s Cohesion Funds’ (2012) Po-
litico, 22 February 2012, available at <www.politico.eu/article/commission-plans-to-sus-
pend-hungarys-cohesion-funds/> accessed 15 March 2019. 
39  State of the Union Address on 12 September 2012, available at <http://europa.eu/rap-
id/press-release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm> accessed 15 March 2019. 
40  Commission, ‘A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’ (Communication) 
COM(2014) 0158 fi nal. 
14 Iris Goldner Lang: The Rule of Law, the Force of Law and the Power of Money in the EU
ticular, it was clearly established with the aim of disciplining Hungary41 
− but also any other Member State in a similar situation.  So far, the 
Commission has activated the Rule of Law Framework and the Art 7 
TEU procedure against Poland, while the European Parliament activated 
the Art 7 TEU procedure against Hungary.42 However, the past few years 
have shown that the Rule of Law Framework is not an effi cient mecha-
nism, while the Art 7 TEU procedure is (unfortunately) dysfunctional, as 
identifying a ‘serious and persistent breach’ requires the unanimity of all 
Member States (excluding the state concerned) in the European Council 
and it is unrealistic to expect this ever to happen in reality.
On the other hand, infringement proceedings are also not always 
the ideal solution to tackle the rule of law crisis, partly due to the uncer-
tain grounds on which an infringement can be based and partly due to 
their limited potential to respond to systemic defi ciencies. The Court of 
Justice has found a way to respond to the problem of restricting judicial 
independence by combining Art 2 TEU, as the legal basis for the rule of 
law, with Art 19 TEU, stipulating the principle of effective judicial pro-
tection, which ‘gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law’.43 
However, it is questionable whether the same legal basis could be used 
if the rule of law is not violated by restricting judicial independence, but 
another element of the rule of law concept. It is also doubtful whether 
infringement proceedings could adequately respond to systemic defi cien-
cies in the rule of law and other values contained in Art 2 TEU in cases 
such as the one in Hungary, where the European Parliament expressed 
concern with regard to twelve different issues.44 
41  KL Scheppele, ‘Hungary and the End of Politics’ (2014) The Nation, 6 May 2014, avail-
able at <www.thenation.com/article/hungary-and-end-politics/> accessed 15 March 2019. 
42  Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law 
in Poland, C/2016/5703 [2016] OJ L217/53. For the triggering of the Art 7 TEU procedure 
against Poland, see the ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk 
of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law’ COM(2017) 835 fi nal. For 
the triggering of the Art 7 TEU procedure against Hungary, see European Parliament reso-
lution of 12 September 2018 calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of 
the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary 
of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)).
43  Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para 
32. This legal basis will probably be used in the pending infringement proceedings in Case 
C-619/18 Commission v Poland, where the Court issued an Order granting interim mea-
sures (Order of the Court in Case C-619/18 R Commission v Poland ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021). 
44  These issues are: the functioning of the constitutional and electoral system; the inde-
pendence of the judiciary; corruption and confl icts of interest; privacy and data protection; 
freedom of expression; academic freedom; freedom of religion; freedom of association; the 
right to equal treatment; the rights of persons belonging to minorities, including Roma and 
Jews; the fundamental rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; and economic and 
social rights (European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling 
on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the 
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The inadequacy or insuffi ciency of the existing mechanisms, which 
have been used to respond to Member States’ violations of the rule of 
law, has forced the Commission to search for a new and more effi cient 
measure. When compared to the measures currently at hand, the Rule 
of Law Proposal is certainly a step in the right direction. It is both legally 
stronger and politically wiser than the (ab)use of the excessive defi cit 
procedure for rule of law purposes. It is also far more powerful than the 
Rule of Law Framework, Art 7 TEU, and infringement proceedings. For 
this reason, there are fair chances that, if adopted, it will turn into the 
most potent mechanism for the protection of the rule of law in the EU. 
Does it matter that the true motive behind the Rule of Law Propos-
al is not openly stated in the Proposal, but is disguised as a fi nancial 
rule? Yes and no. It matters because of transparency. If legally possible, 
it would be better to call a spade a spade. It also matters in terms of the 
ability to measure the results of the Proposal. The only way to determine 
the effi ciency of the Rule of Law Proposal, once it is adopted, is to be 
honest about its true objective. If the Proposal aims to prevent Member 
States’ violations of the rule of law, its effi ciency should be measured by 
analysing the status of the rule of law across the EU, and especially in 
problematic Member States, and not only by looking at whether EU mon-
ey has been properly spent. 
On the other hand, perhaps being honest about the motive is not 
essential in the end, as long as the budget-oriented approached, legally 
backed by Art 322(1)(a) TFEU, is accepted by the EU institutions − in-
cluding the Court of Justice − and by the Member States. Formulating 
the Rule of Law Proposal as a fi nancial rule has both legal and logical 
reasons and can work in practice. This is also certainly not the fi rst time 
in the history of EU integration that a second-best legal basis has been 
used for the accomplishment of a desired political or economic change, 
due to the lack of a better legal basis or for other political reasons. The 
adoption of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Fiscal Com-
pact and the Single Resolution Fund, in the context of European fi scal 
and banking integration, illustrates how the EU has managed to fi nd 
ways to adopt measures necessary to achieve its political and economic 
goals, despite unwillingness or the lack of an adequate Treaty basis.45 
existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is 
founded (2017/2131(INL)), Art 1). For the suggestion that the infringement procedure has 
the potential to be an effective means for addressing systemic defi ciencies in the rule of law, 
see M Schmidt and P Bogdanowicz, ‘The Infringement Procedure in the Rule of Law Crisis: 
How to Make Effective Use of Article 258 TFEU’ (2018) 55, CML Rev 1061, 1069-1073.
45  On the discussion of the instrumentalisation of legal tools in the area of fi scal and bank-
ing integration, see I Goldner Lang and M Lang, ‘Croatia - National Report’ in Gy Bándi and 
others (eds), European Banking Union (Wolters Kluwer 2016).
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Past experience has shown that even though this is neither legally nor 
politically the best option, it is clearly better than nothing. Despite its 
shortcomings, such an instrument can turn out to be a credible and 
successful tool accepted by all the relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, 
it raises moral questions whether it is acceptable for the EU to do what 
is politically desirable, even if under the rule of law this cannot be done. 
And what if the same were not done for a ‘good cause’?
4.2 A suffi ciently direct link 
As noted by the Council Legal Service, not all generalised defi cien-
cies as regards the rule of law are susceptible to having an impact on 
the effective use of EU funds by the Member States.46 One could envis-
age a situation where there is a violation of the rule of law, which is not 
refl ected in the successful use of EU funds. On the other hand, for the 
suspension of payments to be acceptable under EU law, there needs to be 
a suffi ciently direct link between the potential violation and the risk for 
the specifi c operation supported by EU fi nancing.47 When applied to the 
Rule of Law Proposal, this would mean that the rule of law conditionality 
is permissible only provided there is a suffi ciently direct link between the 
violation of the rule of law and the risk of the non-implementation of the 
operation whose fi nancing is being suspended. 
However, when compared to the other existing conditionalities in EU 
law, the rule of law conditionality contains a less direct link between the 
violation and the risk of the non-implementation of the intended opera-
tion. To give an example, one can compare the rule of law conditionality 
with the bailout conditionality, used in relation to the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).48 ESM is one of the measures adopted as a response 
46  Opinion of the Legal Service on the Rule of Law Proposal, 13593/18, LIMITE, Brussels, 
25 October 2018, para 28.
47  Joined Cases T99/09 and T308/09 Italian Republic v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2013:200, 
para 53.
48  Even though conditionality is mostly associated with the pre-accession phase, it is also 
contained in some, though less frequent, instances of the post-accession acquis, such as 
in the measures adopted as a response to the fi nancial crisis in 2010, including the ESM, 
and in relation to EU funds. For example, for conditionality linked to the European Struc-
tural and Investment Funds, see Art 19 and Annex XI (ex ante conditionality), Arts 23 to 25 
(spending conditionality), and Art 85 (ex post conditionality) of Regulation 1303/2013 lay-
ing down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European 
Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on 
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1083/2006 (‘the Common Provision Regulation’ − CPR). For conditionality in the area 
of the EU agricultural policy, see Art 43 and 47 and Recital 37 in Regulation 1307/2013 
establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the frame-
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to the fi nancial crisis in 2010. It links a bailout, ie fi nancial assistance 
to a Member State faced with bankruptcy, with the respective Member 
State’s commitment to reforms and austerity.49 The ESM contains a di-
rect and precisely defi ned link between the objective of the ESM and 
the set conditions of carrying out reforms and austerity measures or, 
in other words, between the violation of these conditions and the risk 
of the failure of the ESM. The aim of the ESM is the fi nancial stability 
of the euro area. Bailout loans to a failing Member State aim to prevent 
any threats to such stability, whereas the reforms and austerity condi-
tions aim to set the failing Member State on the right economic path, 
thus preventing new threats to the euro area.50 On the other hand, the 
non-implementation of reforms and austerity measures by a failing Mem-
ber State directly threaten the stability of the euro area. Consequently, 
there is a suffi ciently direct link between the Member State’s failure to 
comply and the proper functioning of the ESM scheme, which results in 
the Member State’s loss of entitlement to ESM fi nancial assistance. 
As opposed to the bailout conditionality, the rule of law condition-
ality contains a less direct link between the objectives and operations 
performed under EU funds, whose payment can be suspended, and the 
rule of law condition. Quite the reverse, the Rule of Law Proposal can 
indirectly change and expand the objectives of EU funds.51 To give an ex-
ample, the aim of the European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) is 
work of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation 637/2008 and Regulation 
73/2009. For conditionality in the area of justice and home affairs, see, for example, Art 
3(4) of Regulation 513/2014 establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instru-
ment for fi nancial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and 
crisis management and repealing Council Decision 2007/125/JHA. For a discussion of EU 
spending conditionality, see Viorica Vita, ‘Revisiting the Dominant Discourse on Condition-
ality in the EU: The Case of EU Spending Conditionality’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies 116. For a discussion of conditionality in the context of EU 
bailouts, see, for example, C. Kilpatrick, ‘Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge 
Because They Are Not EU Law?’ (2014) 10(3) European Constitutional Law Review 393.  
49  Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, D/12/3 Brussels, 1 February 
2012 (in particular Arts 3 and 12-18). On the link between the bailout conditionality and 
solidarity, see I Goldner Lang, ‘The EU Financial and Migration Crises: Two Crises − Many 
Facets of Solidarity’ in A Biondi, E Dagilyte and E Küçük (eds), Solidarity in EU Law: Legal 
Principle in the Making (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018).
50  Over the past decade, there has been heated discussion among some of the world’s most 
renowned economists whether austerity is the right answer to a fi nancial crisis. One of the 
anti-austerity supporters has also been the Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman. See, for ex-
ample, P Krugman, ‘The Case for Cuts Was a Lie. Why Does Britain Still Believe It? The Aus-
terity Delusion’ The Guardian (London 29 April 2015) available at <www.theguardian.com/
business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion> accessed 7 April 2019. 
51  This and a number of other critiques have been put forward by several Central and East-
ern Member States, such as Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. See E Zalan, ‘Poland, Hungary 
Push Back at EU Budget “Conditionality”’ (EUobserver, 15 May 2018) <https://euobserver.
com/institutional/141808> accessed 5 April 2019). 
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to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion in the European 
Union by correcting the main regional imbalances through investments 
into sustainable jobs, infrastructure, and SMEs.52 Even though the suc-
cess of ERDF investments partly depend on the functioning of the rule of 
law in the respective Member State, the rule of law need not be the key 
factor to lead to the successful implementation of a cohesion instrument. 
There are a number of structural conditions that ensure successful in-
vestments, such as education reforms, strengthening research, techno-
logical development and innovation, digital plans, energy effi ciency, and 
enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs.53 Consequently, the causal link 
between the rule of law condition and the successful implementation of 
the cohesion measure is not particularly strong here. 
In fact, since ERDF investments could be suspended in the case of 
violation of the rule of law, the rule of law objective could reach an ob-
jective diametrically opposed to the one promoted by the ERDF. It can 
contribute to the continued lagging behind of underdeveloped regions, 
thus resulting in further divergence among EU Member States and re-
gions − instead of promoting cohesion. This development, coupled with 
the trend of large-scale emigration (in particular the brain and youth 
drain) from poorer to richer parts of the EU, and with signifi cant pub-
lic debt in certain Member States, would make it even more diffi cult for 
such Member States to fi nance current expenditure and public debt, 
and would result in further economic and social divergence between the 
poorer and richer parts of the EU. The Rule of Law Proposal does indeed 
try to ensure that the consequences of the suspension of the funding do 
not affect the fi nal recipients of the funding, such as local schools, SMEs, 
Erasmus students, researchers and civil society organisations. The Pro-
posal, thus, envisages that the obligation to implement the programme, 
and in particular the obligation to make payments to fi nal benefi ciaries, 
falls on the violating Member State and its entities.54 However, it is highly 
questionable whether the violating Member State will actually respect its 
obligation, especially if it is faced with fi nancial diffi culties.55
52  Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 on the European Regional Development Fund and on 
specifi c provisions concerning the Investment for growth and jobs goal and repealing Regu-
lation (EC) No 1080/2006 [2013] OJ L347/289, Arts 2 and 3. 
53  See ex ante conditionalities in Regulation 1303/2013 laying down common provisions 
on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 [2013] OJ L347/320. 
54  Rule of Law Proposal, Art 4(2). 
55  It is interesting that, despite the likely impact of the suspension of payments on benefi -
ciaries, the Commission did not carry out an impact assessment. The Commission’s deci-
19CYELP 15 [2019] 1-26
4.3 Compatibility with Art 7 TEU
In its Opinion on the Rule of Law Proposal, the Council Legal Service 
stated that it is necessary to ascertain whether the rule of law conditional-
ity mechanism is compatible with other Treaty-based control and sanction 
mechanisms, such as Art 7 TEU.56 A similar issue has already been dis-
cussed in several decisions of the Court of Justice, where the Court stated 
that the conditionality mechanism discussed therein was independent of 
the infringement procedure contained in Art 258 TFEU, as they served 
‘different aims and were subject to different rules’.57 The Council Legal 
Service decided to set off from the same starting points − these being that 
for the Rule of Law Proposal to be compatible with Art 7 TEU, it needs to 
be based on different rules and have different aims from Art 7 TEU.58 Oth-
erwise, according to the Council Legal Service, the Proposal would be a 
mere duplication of Art 7 TEU, which the Treaties would not permit, since 
the only legal basis in the Treaties that allows sanctions against the rule 
of law is Art 7 TEU (and infringement procedures), and it does not allow for 
another mechanism than the one prescribed in this article. 
The Council Legal Service fi rst stated that the two procedures were 
governed by different rules.59 On the other hand, in order to decide wheth-
er the two mechanisms pursued different aims, the Legal Service con-
cluded that it needed to elucidate whether the rule of law conditionality is 
a genuine mechanism for protecting the fi nancial interests of the Union, 
and not a sanctioning mechanism for which Art 7 TEU is intended.60 
Upon analysis, it concluded that the Rule of Law Proposal ‘cannot be re-
garded as independent or autonomous from the procedure laid down in 
Art 7 TEU, as its respective aims and consequences are not properly dis-
tinguished and risk overlapping with each other’, and inferred that the 
Proposal ‘would in reality establish a parallel mechanism of verifi cation 
and control of compliance with [...] the rule of law, for which Art 7 TEU 
sion was based on its reasoning that the sole objective of the Proposal is to avoid the Union’s 
budget being harmed by generalised defi ciencies of the rule of law (see the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Rule of Law Proposal). According to the Commission, this implies that 
there the Proposal has no direct economic, environmental or social impacts, which is highly 
debatable. The opposite view was also expressed in the Opinion of the Court of Auditors, 
which considered that carrying out an impact assessment before publishing the Proposal 
would have allowed for better informed decision-making by the legislative bodies (Opinion 
1/2018 of the Court of Auditors, 2018/C 291/01, para 18). 
56  Opinion of the Legal Service, 13593/18, LIMITE, Brussels, 25 October 2018, para 17.
57  Joined Cases 15 and 16/76 France v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1979:29, para 26; Case 
C-325/94 P, Order of the Court, An Taisce v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1996:293, para 25; 
Case C-247/98 Hellenic Republic v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2001:4, para 13. 
58  Opinion (n 56) para 17. 
59  Opinion (n 56) para 18. 
60  Opinion (n 56) para 19. 
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provides the relevant procedure’.61 The Opinion, therefore, calls upon the 
legislators to modify the Proposal by strengthening the link between the 
respect of the rule of law and the protection of EU fi nancial interests, 
which would, according to the Council Legal Service, make the Proposal 
compatible with Art 7 TEU. 
In a similar tone, when reviewing the legality of the Rule of Law 
Framework in 2014, the Council Legal Service also stated that ‘there 
is no legal basis in the Treaties empowering the institutions to create 
a new supervision mechanism of the rule of law by the Member States, 
additional to what is laid down in Art 7 TEU, neither to amend, modify 
or supplement the procedure’ contained in Art 7 TEU.  The Council Le-
gal Service, therefore, concluded that the Rule of Law Framework ‘is not 
compatible with the principle of conferral’.62 Despite this, the Rule of Law 
Framework has been in operation since 2014, even though it has not 
been particularly successful. 
What both Opinions try to point out is the lack of a Treaty basis for 
another rule of law sanctioning mechanism apart from Art 7 TEU (and 
the infringement procedure contained in Art 258 TFEU). In other words, 
the logic behind the Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the Rule of 
Law Proposal is that the Proposal must not represent a parallel mecha-
nism of control of compliance with the rule of law, for which Art 7 TEU 
is intended, as this is not permissible by the Treaties.63 According to this 
reasoning, the Rule of Law Proposal can be based on Art 322(1)(a) TFEU 
only provided the Proposal is a genuine EU fi nancial management in-
strument and not a disguised sanctioning mechanism. The way to prove 
this, according to the Legal Service, is by determining whether there is a 
suffi ciently strong link between the functioning of the rule of law and the 
implementation of the Union budget. If not, the measure is a disguised 
sanctioning mechanism and, therefore, a duplication of Art 7 TEU. This 
would imply that, in such a case, Art 322(1)(a) TFEU would be an incor-
rect legal basis, even though the Council Legal Service does not say this. 
Is this really so? In the previous subsection on the suffi ciently direct 
link, I suggested that the link between the violation of the rule of law and 
61  Opinion (n 56) para 34. 
62  Opinion of the Legal Service on the Commission’s Communication on a new EU Frame-
work to strengthen the Rule of Law − compatibility with the Treaties, 10296/14, LIMITE, 27 
May 2014, paras 16 and 28. 
63  For a different view, see KL Scheppele, L Pech and RD Kelemen, ‘Never Missing an 
Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity: The Council Legal Service Opinion on the Commis-
sion’s EU Budget-related Rule of Law Mechanism’ (Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2018) 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/never-missing-an-opportunity-to-miss-an-opportunity-the-
council-legal-service-opinion-on-the-commissions-eu-budget-related-rule-of-law-mecha-
nism/> accessed 7 April 2019. 
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the non-implementation of the Union’s budget can, indeed, in certain in-
stances, be distant and indirect. From that perspective, I suggested that 
relying on Art 322(1)(a) TFEU could be problematic, as we are not being 
honest about the Proposal’s key aim and this could also be refl ected in 
how we measure its effectiveness. However, I stated that the link between 
the rule of law and the use of EU funds certainly exists and, provided EU 
institutions − including the Court of Justice − accept it, it could turn into 
a robust instrument with strong effects on Member States’ rule of law. 
However, two questions need to be addressed before embarking on 
an examination whether the Rule of Law Proposal is a sanctioning or a 
fi nancial instrument. First, is it true that Art 7 TEU does not allow the 
adoption of secondary law instruments? And second, is it true that no 
other Treaty provision can control Member States’ compliance with the 
rule of law and have a sanctioning effect in the case of a Member State’s 
violation. In other words, can an instrument be a fi nancial instrument 
with a simultaneous sanctioning effect? If so, such a mechanism could 
co-exist with Art 7 TEU. 
As regards the fi rst question, Art 7 TEU does not seem to envisage 
the adoption of secondary law instruments. However, the second ques-
tion is more complex. Art 7 TEU does not state or imply that no other 
mechanism to protect the values contained in Art 2 TEU would be al-
lowed, so there is nothing to suggest that Art 7 is the exclusive mode of 
protecting EU values. Consequently, the issue is not whether Art 7 TEU 
allows another mechanism triggered by violations of the rule of law − as 
it does not ban it − but rather whether such a mechanism can fi nd an 
adequate legal basis in the Treaties. (For a discussion on this issue, see 
the subsection on legal basis.) 
Along these lines, the statement of the Council Legal Service that 
the Rule of Law Proposal must be based on different rules and pursue 
different aims from the Art 7 TEU mechanism can be read as an asser-
tion of the need to make sure that the Rule of Law Proposal really is a 
fi nancial instrument correctly based on Art 322(1)(a) TFEU, and not a 
disguised rule of law instrument.  Here, it can be said that, provided 
the current Proposal is amended to make the interconnection between 
the rule of law and EU payment more direct, Art 7 TEU and the rule of 
law conditionality mechanism could be viewed as distinct and auton-
omous from each other, despite the fact that both instruments aim at 
ensuring Member State compliance with the rule of law. For the Art 7 
TEU mechanism, the preservation of the rule of law and other values 
contained in Art 2 TEU is its only purpose and target, whereas for the 
Rule of Law Proposal, the rule of law is the aim to be achieved by EU 
fi nancial means.   
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The fact that the suspension of EU payments under the Rule of Law 
Proposal would in reality have a sanctioning effect does not make this 
procedure a duplication of Art 7 TEU. This statement is supported by 
other conditionality mechanisms, which also indirectly protect some of 
the values contained in Art 2 TEU. As an example, the existing ex ante 
conditionality, contained in the Common Provisions Regulation, makes 
Member States’ access to funding from the European Structural and 
Investment Funds conditional on a number of requirements, including 
anti-discrimination, protection of the rights of persons with disabilities, 
and gender equality (whereas equality is one of the EU values also pro-
claimed by Art 2 TEU).64 The Common Provisions Regulation, and the 
adhering ex ante conditionality, is based on Art 177 TFEU which reg-
ulates the procedure for the defi nition of the tasks, objectives and the 
organisation of Structural Funds. Consequently, it has a different legal 
basis from Art 7 TEU, even though it also promotes one of the EU values 
contained in Art 2 TEU and has a sanctioning effect on a Member State 
whose institutional and legal framework does not ensure the protection 
of equality in the implementation of EU-funded programmes. Neverthe-
less, the use of ex ante conditionalities in relation to Structural Funds 
is independent of Art 7 TEU and cannot be seen as its duplication. Sim-
ilarly, the Proposal for the draft Common Provisions Regulation for the 
programming period 2021−2027 further strengthens the conditionali-
ty mechanism by introducing four horizontal and 16 thematic enabling 
conditions, some of which are linked to fundamental rights and equali-
ty.65 Again, a Member State’s failure to fulfi l these conditions could block 
its access to funds. 
64  Art 19 and Annex XI of  Regulation 1303/2013 laying down common provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 [2013] OJ L347/320. 
65  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions on the Europe-
an Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, and 
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and fi nancial rules for those and for the Asylum 
and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa In-
strument’ COM(2018) 375 fi nal. According to Art 11(1) and Annex III of the draft Common 
Provisions Regulation, two horizontal enabling conditions are related to fundamental rights. 
These are the ‘effective application and implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’ and the ‘implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the 
rights of persons with disabilities (UNCRPD) in accordance with Decision 2010/48’. In ad-
dition, according to Art 11(1) and Annex IV, some of the thematic enabling conditions are 
related to fundamental rights, such as the requirement to have a National Roma Integration 
Strategy, national strategic frameworks for gender equality and for social inclusion and 
poverty reduction.
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It is likely that all these conditionality mechanisms, including the 
rule of law conditionality, would be used, at least partly, because Art 7 
TEU is not functional. However, this fact should not be classifi ed as a 
circumvention of Art 7 TEU, as long as there is an adequate Treaty basis 
enabling EU institutions to choose and rely on the existing conditionality 
mechanisms. 
4.4 Too much discretion to the Commission? 
The current version of the Rule of Law Proposal lacks suffi ciently 
specifi c criteria for what constitutes generalised defi ciencies of the rule 
of law which affect or risk affecting EU fi nancial interests.66 It also lacks 
clear criteria for the Commission’s initiation and handling of the proce-
dure and for determining the extent of a suspensive measure.67 The au-
thority to establish defi ciencies is entirely left to the Commission, which 
submits a proposal for an implementing act on the appropriate measure 
to the Council.68 The decision is automatically adopted by the Council, 
unless it decides by a qualifi ed majority to reject the Commission pro-
posal within one month of its adoption by the Commission (reverse qual-
ifi ed majority).69 Authorising the Commission to establish a violation of 
the rule of law without clear benchmarks, combined with the procedure 
of adopting the decision based on a reverse qualifi ed majority in the 
Council, gives too much discretion to the Commission, and opens up the 
question of its control. 
Reverse qualifi ed majority voting ensures the effectiveness of the 
procedure, but it also signifi cantly increases the Commission’s powers 
and opens up the question of its accountability, especially in circum-
stances where the Proposal lacks clear criteria for defi ning the defi cien-
cy, handling the procedure, and determining the scope of the suspensive 
measure.70 It signifi cantly lowers the majority threshold necessary for 
66  The defi nition of a ‘generalised defi ciency as regards the rule of law’ is not suffi ciently 
precise. Art 2(b) of the Rule of Law Proposal states that a ‘generalised defi ciency as regards 
the rule of law … means a widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or a measure by 
public authorities which affects the rule of law’.
67  Art 4 of the Rule of Law Proposal envisages the possibilities of suspending commit-
ments, interrupting payment deadlines, reducing pre-fi nancing or suspending payments, 
all depending on the scope of the defi ciency and the budget management procedure. The 
Proposal provides only very generalised guidelines by saying that the measures taken have 
to be ‘proportionate to the nature, gravity and scope of the generalised defi ciency as regards 
the rule of law’ (Art 4(3)). 
68  Rule of Law Proposal, Art 5(7). 
69  Rule of Law Proposal, Art 5(8). 
70  Reverse majority voting is only rarely applied in EU law. It is used in EU anti-dumping 
policy (reverse simple majority) and in EU economic governance, in relation to the Six Pack 
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the adoption of a decision, thus making the adoption of the Commission’s 
proposal almost automatic.71 Once the Commission has submitted a pro-
posal for an implementing act to the Council, only four Member States 
representing more than 35% of the EU population suffi ce for the adop-
tion of the proposal. A short one-month deadline for gathering enough 
votes against a proposal, as well as the fact that abstentions count as 
votes in favour of the decision, while the Member State which is the sub-
ject of the decision-making cannot take part in the voting, all contribute 
to the effective adoption of the Commission’s proposal. This mechanism 
not only prevents dead-end situations that arise based on Art 7 TEU, but 
makes the adoption procedure almost automatic. However, the Commis-
sion’s increased powers in relation to EU legislative institutions are likely 
to have an impact on the inter-institutional balance of powers, thus em-
phasising even more the importance of amending the Proposal by setting 
clearer criteria to limit its powers. 
The defi ciencies of the current version of the Proposal have been 
acknowledged in the opinions on the Rule of Law Proposal by the Euro-
pean Parliament,72 the European Court of Auditors,73 and the European 
Committee of the Regions.74 All these institutions submitted recommen-
dations for amending the Proposal, which are on the same track. They 
require clearer criteria and a clearer procedure and scope of suspensive 
measures and insist on demonstrating how the legitimate interests of 
the fi nal benefi ciaries would be safeguarded. Additionally, the European 
Parliament requests a stronger role for itself, as the current version of 
and Fiscal Compact (reverse qualifi ed majority). It is also used in the WTO dispute settle-
ment system (reverse consensus). On the pros and cons of reverse majority voting, see W 
Van Aken and L Artige, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Reverse Majority Voting: The WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the EU Anti-Dumping Policy and the Reinforced SGP and 
Fiscal Compact’, EUSA Thirteenth Biennial Conference, Baltimore, USA, 2013, available 
at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2202787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2202787> ac-
cessed 7 April 2019.
71  The votes are counted in accordance with Art 16(4) TEU and Art 238(2) and (3) TFEU. 
According to Art 16(4) TEU, a qualifi ed majority is defi ned as ‘at least 55% of the members of 
the Council, comprising at least fi fteen of them and representing Member States comprising 
at least 65% of the population of the Union’, whereas a blocking minority must include at 
least four Council members representing more than 35% of the population of the partici-
pating Member States.
72  European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 April 2019 on the proposal for a regula-
tion of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget 
in case of generalised defi ciencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, P8_TA-
PROV(2019)0349. 
73  European Court of Auditors Press Release, ‘Plans to Link EU Funding to Rule of Law 
Are Welcome but Need Better Criteria and More Safeguards, Say Auditors’, 17 July 2018. 
74  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions, ‘The Multiannual Financial Frame-
work Package for the Years 2021-2027’, COTER-VI/042.
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the Proposal grants it solely the right to be informed by the Commission 
about the proposed or adopted suspensive measure.75 
5 Conclusion
The rule of law, as a construct in today’s EU liberal democracy, re-
quires a certain form of political and social behaviour, which is agreed 
upon by all EU Member States upon accession to the Union. It forms 
part of the EU social contract and deviations therefrom, especially sys-
temic ones, endanger the functioning of the EU as a whole. Violations of 
the rule of law also undermine citizens’ trust in the EU legal order and 
can shatter their legitimate expectations of the current system, which is 
supposed to provide them with legal certainty and protection against ar-
bitrary powers. This legitimises certain forms of legislative force, aimed 
at protecting the rule of law. The Rule of Law Proposal is an example of 
such a forcible legislative response to the current political reality in the 
EU. By the use of the force of law and the power of money − as suggested 
by the title of this paper − the Rule of Law Proposal aims to compel EU 
Member States to behave according to the standards they agreed upon 
when joining the EU.  To this effect, the Rule of Law Proposal makes 
a statement that the health of a Member State’s rule of law is not just 
its internal affair, but that it concerns the EU directly (including the 
taxpayers of other Member States) through its impact on EU fi nancial 
resources. 
Current trends in a number of EU Member States are a forewarn-
ing that inaction could have dangerous political, social and economic 
consequences. It can stimulate a further weakening of the EU founding 
values in the respective Member State. It can also have a spillover effect 
by encouraging the spread of similar behaviour in other Member States. 
Finally, and of most concern, a passive attitude could lead to a change of 
standards by which we defi ne the rule of law at the EU level. 
Proactive EU-level protection of the rule of law and other EU values 
is imperative, not only for the sake of preserving these values in the 
Union, but also for preserving the Union’s inward and outward credibili-
ty. Past experience, such as the use of mild diplomatic measures of Mem-
ber States (not the EU itself) against Austria in 2000, as a response to 
the entry into the Austrian government of Haider’s radically right-wing 
party Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, reveals that the Union’s inaction or 
inadequate reaction to the violation of one of the fundamental EU values 
in one of the Member States puts at stake both the preservation and per-
ception of these values in the EU, as well as the Union’s credibility. The 
75  Rule of Law Proposal, Art 7. 
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EU’s inaction in these matters means the acceptance of standards dif-
ferent from those aspired to in the Founding Treaties. However, the ne-
cessity to act cannot excuse any type of action, unless it is based on EU 
law.76 Otherwise, we would end up with the absurd result of a measure 
aimed at protecting the rule of law, while itself not satisfying rule-of-law 
standards. The ends cannot justify the means. For this reason, the fi nal 
verdict would be to go forward with an effi cient rule of law mechanism, 
but to make sure that it satisfi es the following two conditions. First, that 
it legally measures up to the standards it aims to promote. Second, that 
it does not do more harm than good by increasing economic and social 
divergence and dissatisfaction among Member States, which would cre-
ate a climate prone to nationalistic and anti-EU emotions and to new and 
increasing violations of the rule of law and other EU values. 
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76  For other initiatives that have been put on the table as possible mechanisms aiming at 
protecting EU values, see A Jakab and D Kochenov, The Enforcement of EU Law and Values: 
Ensuring Member States’ Compliance (OUP 2017). 
